In light of the classic impossibility results of Arrow and Gibbard and Sa erthwaite regarding voting with ordinal rules, there has been recent interest in characterizing how well common voting rules approximate the social optimum. In order to quantify the quality of approximation, it is natural to consider the candidates and voters as embedded within a common metric space, and to ask how much further the chosen candidate is from the population as compared to the socially optimal one. We use this metric preference model to explore a fundamental and timely question: does the social welfare of a population improve when candidates are representative of the population? If so, then by how much, and how does the answer depend on the complexity of the metric space?
INTRODUCTION
" […] and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth. " -Abraham Lincoln Abraham Lincoln's Ge ysburg Address culminated with the o -quoted words above. is single sentence gives a remarkably succinct summary of the role of a country's populace in a participatory democracy, identifying three distinct facets: (1) e government should be of the people: the members of the government should be drawn from -and by inference representative of -the country's populace. ( 2) e government should be by the people: decisions should be made by the populace. (3) e government should be for the people: its objective should be to serve the interests of the populace. In Lincoln's words, the central question we study here is the following: If a government by the people is to be for the people, how important is it that it also be of the people?
In quantifying this question, we observe that there is a surprisingly clean mapping of Lincoln's vision onto central concepts of social choice theory:
(1) Who is the government of? Who are the candidates (people or ideas) to be aggregated? (2) Who is the government by? What are the social choice rules used for aggregation? (3) Who is the government for? What objective function is to be optimized?
While the exact social choice rules to be used have been a topic of vigorous debate for several centuries [5, 12, 14, 15] , the broad class they are drawn from is generally agreed upon: voters provide an ordinal ranking of (a subset of) the candidates, and these rankings are then aggregated to produce either a single winner or a consensus ranking of all (or some) candidates. Social choice is limited by the severe impossibility results of Arrow [5] and Gibbard and Sa erthwaite [19, 28] , establishing that even very simple combinations of desired axioms are in general unachievable. ese impossibility results in turn have resulted in a fruitful line of work exploring restrictions on individuals' preference orders for circumventing the impossibility of social choice.
One of the avenues toward circumventing the impossibility results simultaneously doubles as a framework for addressing the third question: What objective function is to be optimized by the social choice rule? e key modeling assumption is that all candidates (ideas or people) and voters are embedded in a metric space: small distances model high agreement, while large distances correspond to disagreement [6-9, 17, 23, 24, 27] . e metric induces a preference order over candidates for each voter: she simply ranks candidates by distance from herself. When the metric space is speci cally the line, we obtain the well-known and much studied special case of single-peaked preferences [8, 24] . Embedding voters and candidates in a metric space has historically served two purposes: (1) Restricting the metric space -for example, by limiting its dimension -de nes a restricted class of ordinal preference pro les, and might help circumvent the classic impossibility results of social choice. (2) e distances naturally provide an objective function: the best alternative is the one that is closest to the voters on average. Even when the metric space is unrestricted, replacing the hard axioms of social choice theory with this objective function can "circumvent" impossibility results through approximation [25] , and permits comparing di erent social rules by quantifying their worst-case performance.
While distances yield cardinal preferences and a social objective function, it is arguably unrealistic to expect individuals to articulate distances accurately. It is consequently unsurprising that common and well-established voting rules typically restrict voters to providing ordinal information, such as rankings or a single vote. erefore, we view the metric space as implicit, and a social choice function as optimizing the associated cardinal objective function using only ordinal information.
is viewpoint was recently crisply expressed in a sequence of works originating with Anshelevich et al. [1] [2] [3] [4] 20] . In particular, Anshelevich et al. [2] examine many of the most widely used election voting rules, guided by the question: "How much worse is the outcome of voting than would be the omniscient choice of the best available candidate?" ey showed remarkable separations: while some voting rules guarantee a distortion of no more than a constant factor, others are o by a factor that increases linearly in the number of candidates or -even worse -voters. e simplest, and in some sense canonical, example of such distortion is captured as follows: Because the centrist voters express their (slight) preference for the right-wing candidate, he is elected by a small majority. However, the average distance from the population to the right-wing candidate (1.5) is thrice that to the le -wing candidate (0.5), meaning that the majority vote led to a loss of a factor three in the utility.
We follow prior nomenclature [2, 10, 11, 13, 26] and term this utility loss the distortion. A closer examination of Example 1.1 suggests a likely culprit for the high distortion: the right-wing candidate was not representative of the population -he was not of the people. Had we drawn two candidates from the population, the winner would in fact always be the socially optimal choice in this case. If we wanted to create the possibility of recreating the above example, we would need to move some fraction δ of the population to the right wing. If δ were large, then the election of a right-wing candidate would not be nearly as bad according to the objective function; conversely, if δ were small, then it would be unlikely that a right-wing candidate would run, so most of the time the social choice rule would select an optimal candidate. us, intuitively, when candidates are drawn from the population, we would expect the distortion in the social cost to be be er than when they are not. e goal of this article is to investigate to what extent this intuition holds.
The Model
Formally, we assume that the candidates and voters are jointly located in a ( nite) metric space; the distance between i and j is denoted by d i,j . e candidates' locations are given by a probability distribution p, while the voters' location distribution is denoted by q. In order to isolate the driving question and side-step issues of speci c voting rules, we focus on the simplest social choice scenario: two candidates i,i ′ are drawn i.i.d. from p, and a simple majority vote determines the winner between them. Voter j votes for the one of i,i ′ who is closer 1 to j. e social cost of candidate i is c i = j q j d i,j . With w (i,i ′ ) denoting the winner of the election and o(i,i ′ ) the socially optimal candidate, the expected distortion of voting is i,
. Our goal is then to understand how much the distortion decreases when candidates are of the people (when p = q).
Our Results
We begin our investigation with arguably the simplest metric space, which nonetheless is frequently used to describe the political spectrum of countries: the line. As we saw in Example 1.1, even for the line, voting between two arbitrary candidates can lead to a distortion of 3. Our rst main result (proved in Section 3) is that when two candidates are drawn i.i.d. from p = q, the expected distortion is at most 4 − 2 √ 2 ≈ 1.1716, and this bound is tight. e lower-bound example is in fact of the type discussed a er Example 1.1, obtained by moving a suitable population mass δ from location ϵ to location 1. e more di cult part of the proof is the upper bound, and in particular, the proof that the worst-case distribution of voters/candidates always has support size 3. e proof proceeds by showing that for larger support sizes, there is always a sequence of alterations that gradually shi s the population to fewer locations, without lowering the distortion.
Next, we turn our a ention to general metric spaces. For arbitrary metric spaces, the distortion of voting can be larger. In Section 5, we analyze a simple example: just under half the population is located at one point i, while the rest of the population is spread out evenly over n ≫ 1 locations that are at distances just below 1 from each other and at distance 1 from i. As n → ∞, we show that the expected distortion converges to 3 2 . e upper bound we establish in Section 5 does not match this lower bound: we show that for every metric and every p, the expected distortion is at most 2 − 1 652 . We conjecture that the bound of 3 2 is in fact tight -proving or disproving this conjecture is a natural direction for future work, discussed in Section 6. e signi cance of our upper bounds on distortion (for the line and for general metric spaces) arises from the contrast to the corresponding bounds when q p. In revisiting the improved distortion results we prove, we notice two potential driving factors: (1) e two candidates are independently and identically distributed. (2) e distributions of candidates and voters are the same. One may wonder whether the innocuous-looking assumption of i.i.d. candidates alone could be responsible for the lower distortion, without requiring that candidates be of the people. In Section 4, we rule out this possibility by establishing a (tight) bound of 2 on the distortion of voting when candidates are drawn i.i.d. from p q, both in general metrics and on the line. e (small, but constant) gap between the distortions of 2 − 1 652 and 2 in general metric spaces, and the signi cant gap between the distortions of 4 − 2 √ 2 ≈ 1.1716 and 2 on the line, show that government by the people is more e cient when it is also of the people. e exact size of the gap between the two distortions in general metric spaces is a natural open question.
Related Work
ere has been a lot of interest recently in circumventing the impossibility results of voting and social choice by approximation; see, e.g., [13, 25, 26] and [11] for a recent survey. Of particular interest is the recent direction in which the voters' objective functions are derived from proximity in a metric space [1-4, 18, 20] . One of the important issues is providing incentives for truthful revelation of preferences (e.g., [18] ); in this paper, we side-step this issue by considering only elections between two candidates at a time.
Our work is most directly inspired by the recent work of Anshelevich et al. [2, 3] , which analyzes the distortion of ordinal voting rules when evaluated for metric preferences. Our work departs from [2, 3] in assuming that the candidates themselves are drawn i.i.d. from underlying distributions, and in analyzing the case when the distributions of candidates and voters are the same.
Anshelevich and Postl [3] consider a condition of instances that also aims to capture that candidates are in some sense "representative" of the voting population. Speci cally, they de ne a notion of decisiveness as follows: Let i be a voter, and j i , j ′ i her two closest candidates, with
i for all i; in other words, when α ≪ 1, every voter has a strongly preferred candidate. Naturally, the decisiveness condition is applicable only in elections in which the number of candidates is large or the space of voters is highly clustered. In our work, by considering candidates drawn from the voter distribution, we avoid such assumptions.
PRELIMINARIES
e candidates and voters are embedded in a nite metric space D = (d i,j ) i,j with points (locations) i = 1, . . . ,n. Depending on the context, we will refer to i as a point, candidate, or voter. e probability for a candidate to be drawn from point i is p i ; we write p = (p i ) i . e fraction of voters at i is q i , summarized as q = (q i ) i . For a subset of points A, we write p A = i ∈A p i to denote the total probability mass in A, and similarly for q A . e social cost of a candidate i is his average distance to all voters: c i = j q j · d i,j . When candidates i and i ′ are competing, each voter j votes for the candidate that is closer 2 to her, i.e., for argmin i,i ′ (d (j,i),d (j,i ′ )). e winner is the candidate who gets more votes: i wins i j:d i,j ≤d i ′ ,j q j ≥ 1 2 . For two candidates i,i ′ , let w (i,i ′ ) denote the winner as just described, and let o(i,i ′ ) = argmin j ∈ {i,i ′ } c j be the candidate of lower social cost. e distortion of an election between two candidates (i,i ′ ) is de ned as
We are interested in the (expected) distortion of the instance (D,p,q), de ned as the expected distortion of an election between two candidates drawn i.i.d. from the candidate distribution p:
In particular, our goal is to analyze the worst-case distortion when the candidates are representative and when they are not, that is, we want to nd the gap between max D,p,q C (D,p,q) and max D,p C (D,p,p) .
IDENTICAL DISTRIBUTIONS ON THE LINE
We begin with the simplest se ing: the underlying metric space is the line, and two candidates are drawn independently from the population of voters (p = q). We rst show a family of examples (a variant of Example 1.1) for which the expected distortion gets arbitrarily close to 4−2 √ 2 ≈ 1.1716.
is example is obtained from Example 1.1 by moving a suitable fraction of voters from location x 2 = ϵ to x 3 = 1, carefully trading o between two factors: (1) decreasing the pairwise distortion between the candidates at −1 and 1, but (2) increasing the chance of a such an election happening. Because the voters at x 2 = ϵ are slightly closer to 1 than to -1, a candidate drawn from x 3 = 1 will win against a candidate drawn from x 1 = −1. e costs of the two candidates are
Because the candidates are drawn independently from p, the election between x 1 and x 3 happens with probability 2p 1 p 3 . In all other cases (when a candidate from x 2 runs against one from x 1 or x 3 , or both candidates are from the same location), the voters elect the socially be er candidate. us,
Our rst main result is that Example 3.1 gives the worst distortion on the line.
We will prove eorem 3.2 in Section 3.2. In preparation, in Section 3.1, we rst provide some structural characterization results about the voting behavior and social cost on the line.
Characterizing the Structure of Voting on the Line
Given a distribution on the line with support size n, we label the support points as 1, . . . ,n from le to right. Let m be the index of the median 3 , and let L = {1, . . . ,m − 1} and R = {m + 1, . . . ,n} denote the locations to the le and to the right of the median, respectively. By the de nition of the median,
If two candidates (x, ) are drawn, the one closer to m wins the election.
P
. Without loss of generality, we assume that d x,m < d ,m and x ∈ L ∪ {m}; that is, x lies to the le of the median, or x is the median. ere are two cases depending on whether is also to the le of m.
(1) If ∈ L, then all voters to the right of the median as well as the median are going to vote for x, so x gets a p m + p R > 1 2 fraction of the votes. 
. Without loss of generality, assume that x ∈ L ∪ {m}, ∈ L, and d x,m < d ,m . Intuitively, x has smaller social cost because more than half of the population need to rst get to x before they can get to . Formally, we have
As a simple corollary of Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4, notice that if two candidates (x, ) are drawn from the same side of the median (including when one of them is the median), majority voting always elects the socially be er candidate. is observation allows us to simplify the expression for C (D,p,p) on the line, 2. e high-level idea is that, given any instance (L,p) with support size larger than 3, we can iteratively reduce its support size to 3 using a series of operations (Lemmas 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7), while preserving (or increasing) C (L,p,p). Once the instance has support size 3, we can optimize the locations and probabilities of these 3 points.
As before, let m be the index of the median, and let L = {1, . . . ,m − 1} and R = {m + 1, . . . ,n} denote the points to the le and to the right of the median, respectively. We can assume that both L and R are non-empty; otherwise, the median is the le most or rightmost point, and we always elect the socially be er candidate. e proof proceeds by moving probability mass within L or within R to merge points until |L| = |R| = 1. None of the operations in this section will change the median m, so the election results are still decided by the candidates' distance to m.
When shi ing the probability mass, we will not be able to guarantee that no pairwise election sees a decrease in distortion. Instead, we use a more global argument to show that the operation increases the distortion on average. We de ne r i to be the expected distortion conditioned on one of the candidates being i, and the other candidate being drawn according to p, that is,
We will show that so long as p L , p m , and p R remain the same, C (L,p,p) is a linear function of the average distortion on one side of the median. By Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4, the pairwise distortion can be larger than 1 only if two candidates are on di erent sides of m; therefore,
e two preceding equations formalize that whenever p L and p R stay constant and i ∈R p i r i (or i ∈R p i r i ) does not decrease, C (L,p,p) also does not decrease. is fact is exploited repeatedly in the proofs of the following lemmas. . Since the operation does not change p L or p R , it is su cient to show that ∈R p r does not decrease. By Lemma 3.3, all election results between pairs i, j ≤ * are preserved. Let p ′ i ,c ′ i , and r ′ i denote the corresponding values of p i ,c i and r i a er the operation. en, for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ * ,
A er the shi of probability mass, * is the largest index. Consider m < ≤ * . Using that elections between two candidates on the same side of the median always result in the socially be er candidate winning, we bound
Any candidates that used to be at > * are now at * , and * used to be the worst candidate in R. Hence, for all of the probability mass from locations > * , the expected distortion also weakly increases. Combining these two cases, we get Lemma 3.5 can be applied repeatedly unless the two worst candidates x * and * are the le most and rightmost points. We next show that in that case, either all the probability mass of L or all the probability mass of R can be moved to x * or * , respectively. L 3.6. Let x * and * be the worst candidates in L and R. Assume w.l.o.g. that d m,x * < d m, * . If x * = 1 and * = n, then moving all probability mass from R to * does not decrease C (L,p,p).
. As for the previous lemma, because we are only shi ing probability mass within R, it is su cient to show that ∈R p r does not decrease. Because more probability mass moved closer to * , we have that c ′ * ≤ c * , and because probability mass moved away from L (to the right), we get that c ′ i ≥ c i for all i ∈ L ∪ {m}. By Lemma 3.3, * loses all of his elections both before and a er the move. Moreover, by Lemma 3.4, we get r * = (1 −p L ) + i ∈L p i r i, * before the move, and r ′
we get that r ′ * ≥ r * . Finally, because * used to be the worst candidate in R, and a er the move of probability mass is the only candidate in R, we bound
Once neither Lemma 3.5 nor Lemma 3.6 can be applied, we can apply Lemma 3.7. L 3.7. Let x * = 1, * = n be the worst candidates in L and R, respectively. If |R| = 1 and d m, * > d m,x * , then either C (L,p,p) can be strictly increased, or the size of L can be reduced by 1 without decreasing C (L,p,p).
. Notice that m = n − 1 and L = {1, . . . ,n − 2}. Recall that the only elections in which the winner could be socially inferior are those involving * and a candidate x ∈ L. Because d m, * > d m,x * ≥ d m,i for all i, we obtain that * loses all elections. We split the proof into two cases.
(1) If there exists an i ∈ L with c i ≤ c * , then in particular, c n−2 ≤ c * . us, candidate n − 2 wins all elections against i ≤ n −2 (as he should) and against * (as he should), while losing to m (as he should). is implies that r n−2 = 1.
Consider the e ect of moving all probability mass from n − 2 to the median m = n − 1. First, all elections results remain the same. e contribution of the probability mass that used to be at n − 2 to the distortion does not change. (It was 1 before and is still 1.) Furthermore, c * decreases while c i increases for all i < n − 2. Because * loses all pairwise elections, the overall distortion can only increase.
(2) If c i > c * for all i ∈ L, the expected distortion is exactly
Let x i denote the position of point i on the line. Writing Y := j >1 p j |x n − x j | and
Treating everything except x 1 as constant, and dividing out constant factors suitably, the relevant part of this expression is of the form is always the sign of βA + B. If βA + B 0, then the expected distortion can be strictly increased by moving x 1 in one direction or the other; otherwise, x 1 can be increased all the way to x 2 without decreasing the expected distortion.
We are now ready to prove eorem 3.2. P T 3.2. By Lemmas 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7, the worst-case instance (L,p,p) has support size (at most) 3. Let x 1 ≤ x 2 ≤ x 3 be the locations on the line. By rescaling and mirroring, we may assume without loss of generality that x 1 = 0, x 3 = 1, and x 2 > 1 2 . If x 2 were not the median of the distribution, then the socially be er candidate would always win, giving C (L,p,p) = 1. So in a worst-case distribution, x 2 must be the median, and the socially worse candidate must win the election between x 1 and x 3 . Because x 2 > 1 2 , x 3 is closer to the median, so he wins the election between x 1 and x 3 ; therefore, x 1 must have lower cost than x 3 . e expected distortion is
is expression is monotonically decreasing in x 2 and monotonically increasing in p 1 , so it is maximized when we take the limit x 2 → 1 2 and p 1 → 1 2 . In particular,
which is maximized at p 3 = √ 2−1 2 (as in Example 3.1), where it a ains a value of 4 − 2 √ 2.
DIFFERENT DISTRIBUTIONS
In this section, we prove a tight bound of 2 on the worst-case distortion of voting, when two candidates are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution p which may be di erent from the voter distribution q. is ratio is tight for both general metric spaces and the line, and the lemmas we prove in this section apply to arbitrary metric spaces.
We begin with an example on the line (a variant of Example 1.1) which establishes the lower bound of 2. e candidate distribution p has probability 1/2 at position −1, and the other 1/2 at position 1. e voter distribution q has a (1/2 − ϵ ) fraction of the voters at position −1, while the remaining voters are just to the right of center at position ϵ > 0. With probability 1/2, we draw two di erent candidates, and the distortion is 3 − O (ϵ ); otherwise, we draw two candidates from the same location, ge ing a distortion of 1. erefore, the expected distortion of the instance is 2 − O (ϵ ) → 2 as ϵ → 0. e challenge is to establish the matching upper bound. In proving the upper bound, some of the techniques we establish will be useful in Section 5. e overall proof structure is as follows. First, we show in Lemma 4.2 that if i = w (i,i ′ ), then c i ≤ 3c i ′ . at is, while the election winner can be socially worse, he cannot be too much worse. 4 Lemma 4.2 is the only place where we use the metric structure and the voter distribution. Subsequently, we rewrite the social cost function C (D,p,q) accordingly, and then treat the costs as completely arbitrary numbers.
Second, in Lemma 4.3, we prove that if all pairwise elections have distortion at most 1 ≤ α ≤ 3, then C (D,p,q) ≤ (1 + α )/2. (While in this section, we will only use the lemma with α = 3, the version with general α constitutes a key step in Section 5.)
In the following derivation, we will use that: • Because i beats i ′ , at least half of the voters are at least as close to i as to i ′ .
• For any voter j who is at least as close to i as to i ′ , the triangle inequality implies that
. en, we can bound c i as follows: 
. Consider an instance (D,p,q) and its associated costs c. Without loss of generality, assume that c 1 ≤ c 2 ≤ · · · ≤ c n . For each candidate i, let ℓ i = max{j | c j ≤ αc i }. Notice that by the assumption that r i,j ≤ α for all i, j, whenever j > ℓ i , we have that w (i, j) = o(i, j), resulting in a cost ratio of 1. We can therefore bound the expected distortion (minus 1) as follows:
e upper boundĈ (p,c,α ) assumes that the worse candidate wins whenever the two candidates' social costs are within a factor of α of each other. Note that this upper boundĈ (p,c,α ) makes no more reference to distances or voter distributions. It depends on a distribution over candidates and a cost vector, both of which can be arbitrary, and it assumes that all elections whose candidates' costs are more than a factor α apart choose the socially be er candidate, while all other elections choose the socially worse candidate.
We will now argue thatĈ (p,c,α ) is at most α −1 2 . First, we show that the expression is maximized by moving probability mass so that c i and c j are at most a factor α apart for every i and j in the support of p. Suppose that there exists a pair i < j in the support of p with j > ℓ i , i.e., with c j > αc i . Consider moving ϵ probability mass from p i to p j , where a negative value of ϵ moves probability mass from p j to p i ; call the resulting probability vector p(ϵ ). Because our choice of i and j avoids the bilinear term p i p j in (2),Ĉ (p(ϵ ),c,α ) is a linear function of ϵ. erefore, the expression is maximized at an extreme, i.e., by moving all the probability mass from one of i and j to the other.
Once all points in the support of p are at most a factor α apart in social cost, the expression for C (p,c,α ) in (2) becomes a sum over all pairs of points. Assume that the support of p has size n ′ ≥ 3, and associated costs c 1 < c 2 < · · · < c n ′ . ( e inequalities can be assumed to be strict, because two ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2017.
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EC'17, June 26-30, 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA points i,i ′ with the same cost can be merged without a ecting the valueĈ (p,c,α ).) Considering all terms except c 2 as constants,Ĉ (p,c,α ) is of the form β 1 + β 2 c 2 + β 3 /c 2 (with β 2 , β 3 ≥ 0), which is convex in c 2 . In particular, it a ains its maximum at c 2 = c 1 or c 2 = c 3 . In either case, we can merge the probability mass of point 2 with 1 or 3, reducing the support size by 1 without decreasinĝ C (p,c,α ). By repeating such merges, we eventually arrive at a distribution with support size 2 and c 2 ≤ αc 1 . Finally, we can bound
IDENTICAL DISTRIBUTIONS IN GENERAL METRIC SPACES
In this section, we examine the se ing where the underlying metric space is arbitrary, and the candidates are drawn i.i.d from the population of voters. We establish the following main theorem: We prove Lemma 5.2 in Section 5.2. e proof relies on the following structural characterization: if a pair of candidates has distortion 3 − δ for su ciently small δ , then the instance must be very structured: nearly half the probability mass must be concentrated very close to the socially optimal candidate, and most of the remaining candidates must be nearly equidistant to the two candidates. P T 5.1. We begin by proving the lower bound, by constructing a family of instances whose distortion converges to 3 2 . We label the n + 1 points {0, 1, . . . ,n}. We set p 0 = 1−ϵ 2 , and all other p i = 1+ϵ 2n . e distances 5 are d 0,i = 1 for all i > 0, and d i,j = 1 − ϵ for all i, j > 0. See Figure 3 for an illustration. is way, all voters/candidates in the set {1, . . . ,n} prefer each other over the voter/candidate 0. erefore, even though candidate 0 is socially optimal (with a cost c 0 = 1 2 + O (ϵ )), he loses to any other candidate in the election; the other candidates' costs are
, an election occurs between candidate 0 and some other candidate i > 0, resulting in distortion 2 − O (ϵ ) − O (1/n). In the other cases (two candidates from 0, or two candidates i, j > 0), the distortion is at least 1. Hence, the overall expected distortion is at least
which approaches 3 2 as ϵ → 0, n → ∞. For the upper bound, let δ = 1 326 and consider the following two cases. If all pairwise elections have distortion at most 3−δ , then Lemma 4.3 implies that the overall expected distortion C (D,p,p) is at most 2 − δ/2 = 2 − 1 652 . If some pair of candidates has distortion at least 3 − δ , then Lemma 5.2 implies that the overall expected distortion is at most 3 2 + 9 √ δ ≤ 2 − 1 652 . Together, these two cases complete the proof of the theorem.
As mentioned above, the key insight in the proof of Lemma 5.2 is that when a pair of candidates has r x, ≥ 3 − δ , nearly half the probability mass must be concentrated very close to the socially optimal candidate, and most of the remaining candidates must be nearly equidistant to the two candidates. Trading o these four sources of approximation makes the proof of the lemma fairly complex. To illustrate the key ideas more cleanly, we therefore begin by proving the following special case of Lemma 5.2 with δ = 0. As before, we let p A = i ∈A p i denote the total probability mass in A. roughout this section, p A is the conditional candidate/voter distribution given that candidate i is drawn from A; that is, (p A ) i = p i /p A . We use d i,A = E j∼p A d i,j to denote the average distance from i to the set A.
Proof of Lemma 5.3
Assume that = w (x, ) and x = o(x, ). We assume w.l.o.g. that d x, = 2. e fact that c = 3c x implies very stringent conditions on the instance: we begin by showing that half of the probability mass must be at x, x is socially optimal, and all other locations are at distance 6 1 from x and .
Let Y be the set of voters preferring over x, and X = Y the set of voters preferring x over . en,
Because c = 3c x by assumption, all of the inequalities must be tight, and therefore:
(1) By the second (in)equality, p Y = p X = 1 2 . (2) By the nal (in)equality, d x,Y = d ,Y , so all points in Y are equidistant from x and . Furthermore, because p X d x,X = 3p X d x,X , we get d x,X = 0. (3) By the rst (in)equality, d ,X = d ,x + d x,X = 2. (4) By the third (in)equality, d ,
Because d x,X = 0, we can write p x = 1 2 . We then have that c x = 1 2 , and c = 3 2 . Let A denote the set of all candidates other than x. e expected distortion is then
We will show that ∆ i,j ≤ 5 for all i, j ∈ A, and thus C (D,p,p) ≤ 1.5. e three key properties we exploit repeatedly are the following.
(1) x is socially optimal, i.e., c i ≥ c x for all i ∈ A. is is because c x = 1 2 , and for each i ∈ A, at least all voters at x are at distance 1.
(2) c i ≤ 3c x for all i ∈ A. is is because d i,A ≤ d i,x + d x,A = 2 and d i,x = 1, giving a total cost of at most 3 2 .
is is because everyone in A has to vote for i, implying that d i,A ≤ 1, giving c i ≤ 1. Now x some pair i, j ∈ A, and assume without loss of generality that i wins the election over j. For each of the three elections that contribute to ∆ i,j (i vs. x, j vs. x, i vs. j), there is a term which is 1 if the election chooses the socially be er candidate (e.g., w (i,x ) = o(i,x )), and at most 3 otherwise. us, if we ever had ∆ i,j > 5, at least two of the three elections would have to produce the socially worse candidate as a winner, e.g., w (i,x ) o(i,x ). We distinguish three possible cases.
(1) If x beats j, then i must beat x and (because we assumed i to beat j) j must have lower cost than i. Because x is socially optimal (in particular having lower social cost than j), using that c i ≤ 2c x , we have that
(2) If x beats i, then j must beat x and have lower cost than i. en we obtain the expression.
Treating c j as a variable t, we have an expression of the form t c x + c i t , which is convex and hence maximized at an extreme point (t = c i or t = c x ), giving an upper bound of 1 + 1 + c i c x ≤ 5. (3) Finally, we have the case that both i and j beat x (implying that c i ≤ 2c x and c j ≤ 2c x ).
If i has lower social cost than j, we can bound ∆ i,j = r i,x + r j,x + r i,j ≤ 2 + 2 + 1 = 5.
Otherwise we have c x ≤ c j < c i , and obtain the expression
5.2 Proof of Lemma 5.2 e proof of Lemma 5.2 follows the same roadmap as the proof of Lemma 5.3, except that we no longer have a point with probability mass 1/2. Instead, close to half of the probability mass will be in a ball B of small radius around x. e three key properties used to bound ∆ i,j will then be replaced with approximate (slightly inferior) versions.
For any pair of candidates i, j, we will be frequently using the following upper bounds on c i :
Inequality (3) is simply by the triangle inequality, while Inequality (4) also uses the fact that half of the voters are closer to i, and at most the remaining half can contribute to the cost gap.
Let = c x + 1, we obtain that c x ≤ 1 2−δ . As before, let X be the set of voters closer to x than to , and Y = X the set closer to . en, p X ≤ 1 2 ≤ p Y . Following our intuition from the proof of Lemma 5.3, we partition the points into three disjoint sets A, B and C. Speci cally, we will choose (later) a parameter p close to 1/2. As before, the set A captures the points that are "roughly equidistant" between x and ; speci cally:
where we will choose ρ A so that p A = p. e set B captures the points "close to" x: B = {i | d i,x ≤ ρ B } ⊆ X , where we choose ρ B so that p B = p. 7 e set C consists of the remaining points C = A ∪ B. (C may contain points from both X and Y , and p C = 1 − 2p.) Observe that the closer p is to 1/2, the larger ρ A and ρ B will be, and we will have less 7 Notice that such ρ A , ρ B exist without loss of generality. For if there were a radius ρ such that -say - where the stringent assumption of δ = 0 allowed us to choose p = 1/2 and still get ρ A = ρ B = 0. We use the fact that c x ≈ 1 2 to derive that close to half of the probability mass must be in A, and close to half in B. To lower-bound the probability mass, notice that the cost of x can be lower-bounded term-by-term as follows:
(1) All points in B contribute cost at least 0.
(2) All points in X \ B contribute cost at least ρ B .
(3) All points in A contribute cost at least 1.
(4) All points in Y \ A contribute cost at least 1 + ρ A . We can thus lower bound c x as follows:
. In particular, notice that even while choosing the desired probability p very close to half (e.g., p = 1/2−O ( √ δ )), the cost bound still guarantees that such a p is achieved with small radii:
For notational convenience, we use ρ = δ (2−δ ) (1−2p ) to denote the upper bound for
e expected distortion can now be broken into terms based on the three partitions A,B,C.
We bound the terms in the sum separately.
• E i∼p C ,j∼p A∪B r i,j ≤ 3 − δ , simply because we assumed that the worst-case pairwise distortion of any election was 3 − δ . • e same bound of 3 − δ applies to C (D,p C ,p), for the same reason. • When both candidates i, j are drawn from B, assume that i wins while j has lower social cost. We can use Inequalities (4) (for i and j) and (3) (for j and x, the la er having cost at
We apply Lemma 4.3, and obtain that C (D,p B ,p) ≤ 1
Similar to the proof of Lemma 5.3, we de ne ∆ i,j,b = r i,b + r j,b + r i,j , and upper-bound ∆ i,j,b for all i, j ∈ A and b ∈ B by a quantity which tends to 5 as p → 1/2 and ρ → 0. e proof of the following lemma involves an intricate case analysis, and is relegated to the end of this section.
Substituting all the upper bounds into the expected distortion, we obtain that 
gives an upper bound of C (D,p,p) ≤ 48+196δ 0.5 −348δ −287δ 1.5 +275δ 2 +193δ 2.5 −39δ 3 −46δ 3.5 −8δ 4 32(1+δ 0.5 /2) 2 (1−δ 0.5 )(1−δ 0.5 −δ /2) . Dropping dominated terms (negative in the numerator, positive in the denominator), this expression can be upper-bounded by
Finally, using the upper bound δ ≤ 1 100 , we obtain that
is completes the proof of Lemma 5.2. P L 5.4. Note that, for all i ∈ A and b ∈ B, we have
In the proof of Lemma 5.3, the three key properties were that (1) x was socially optimal, (2) any i ∈ A was at most thrice worse than x, and (3) if i ∈ A beat x in a pairwise election, then it was at most twice worse than x. e relaxed versions of these key properties are the following:
(1) Every b ∈ B is close to socially optimal: For all i ∈ A and b ∈ B, 
is ratio is at least 3 and approaches 3 as ρ → 0. (3) For any i ∈ A that wins the pairwise election against b ∈ B,
is ratio is at least 2 and approaches 2 as ρ → 0. We now x i, j ∈ A and b ∈ B, and upper-bound ∆ i,j,b through a detailed case analysis based on who wins (and is socially be er) in the three elections (i, j), (i,b), (j,b). W.l.o.g., we assume that i wins the election against j. roughout the analysis, as in the proof of Lemma 5.3, we use repeatedly that t c b + c i t is a convex function of t, and in particular is maximized at t = c i or t = c b . (1) If the socially be er candidate wins in at least two of the three elections, then ∆ i,j,b ≤ 1 + 1 + 3 − δ = 5 − δ , because the third election can have distortion at most 3 − δ . (2) If both i and j lose to b,
. Because we are not in the rst case, at most one of the three maxima can be 1.
ere are three orderings of the social costs c b ,c i ,c j which are consistent with these assumptions: ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2017.
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EC'17, June 26-30, 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA (some) political o cials are chosen through lo eries instead of (or in addition to) elections. Two of the arguments put forth in favor of lo ocracy are: (1) it is more inclusive [22] , in the sense that the o ce holders will be more representative of the population as a whole and its di erent subgroups;
(2) it leads to more responsive government [21] : because o ce holders are representative of the population, they will respond more directly to the preferences of the population. e de nition of inclusiveness is very closely aligned with our notion of candidates being "of the people;" it is sometimes justi ed by empirical and simulation studies giving evidence that inclusive groups may be be er at problem solving. e notion of responsiveness is similar to our notion of government being "for the people;" in this sense, our results could be -with some latitude -rephrased as stating that inclusiveness may lead to responsiveness. While most proponents of lo ocracy argue in favor of lling o ces with randomly selected citizens, our analysis applies to a process wherein voters do have a say, but the slate of candidates is random. Allowing a vote between randomly selected candidates may in fact address one of the main concerns aboud lo ocracy, namely, the competency of candidates [21, 22] . It simultaneously addresses a concern about democratic votes: that the slate of candidates could be such that voters make a societally suboptimal choice. While the mathematical model presented here is far too simplistic to provide reliable insights into the merits (or problems) of lo ocracy and its variants, it may serve as a point of departure for future more re ned models.
In terms of more direct technical questions, the most immediate open question is to obtain the maximum expected distortion in general metric spaces. We conjecture an upper bound of 3/2. Our conjecture is based on extensive computational experiments, and on several partial results. In particular, we can show that the distortion is upper-bounded by 3/2 whenever the metric is uniform (i.e., all voters/candidates are equidistant), or when there is a location of the metric space that has half the voters/candidates. Both properties seem to naturally arise in worst-case constructions, although we are unable to prove at this point that they are necessary for worst-case metrics.
Beyond the immediate open question, our work raises a number of other directions for future work. A rst natural question is how the distortion depends on the metric space. As we saw, the distortion for the line is 4 − 2 √ 2 < 3 2 . What is the distortion for d-dimensional Euclidean space? Are there other natural metric spaces that are suitable models of political or similar a liation, and may be amenable to a detailed analysis?
In this work, in order to isolate the issue of representativeness of candidates, we focused on a majority election between two candidates. When k > 2 candidates are running, vote aggregation becomes more complex, and indeed, a large number of di erent voting rules have been considered throughout history. e work of Anshelevich et al. [2, 3] analyzed the worst-case distortion of some of the most prevalent voting rules. It would be interesting to examine the performance of these voting rules under our model of candidates drawn from the voter population. In particular, would such an analysis reveal a more ne-grained strati cation between some of the voting rules that perform equally well (or poorly) under worst-case assumptions?
A further direction is to deviate from the extremes of worst-case candidates or candidates drawn from the voter distribution. How gracefully does the distortion degrade as the voter and candidate distributions become more and more dissimilar? Answering this question rst requires a suitable de nition of a distance metric between probability distributions. Such a de nition will have to be "Earthmover-like, " yet also "scale-invariant. " supported in part by NSF Grant CCF-1423618 and NSF Grant IIS-1619458. e authors would like to thank Elliot Anshelevich and Utkash Dubey for useful conversations, and anonymous reviewers for helpful feedback.
